Universities are never neutral.

The geopolitics of higher education has become increasingly apparent. These days, few people still believe that universities somehow stand above politics. Especially now that Trump is back in power, it’s clear how quickly science and higher education become entangled in (geo)political tensions. And yet, we often cling to the idea – or the hope – that knowledge is universal and universities are neutral spaces. In a recent study, Simon Marginson shows just how misleading that image can be. His analysis traces how globalisation and power have reshaped the landscape of higher education over the past decades. This helps explain why we are once again feeling the consequences today.

The open world of the 1990s

It feels like a lifetime ago, but after 1990, the world suddenly seemed wide open. The Cold War was over, the US and the West were leading globalisation, and universities eagerly jumped on board. English became the lingua franca. Global rankings from London and Shanghai decided who mattered. International mobility grew at an unprecedented scale. This brought opportunities: more collaboration, more students learning across borders, and more knowledge exchange. But there was a downside, too. The rules of the game were primarily Western. Anyone who wanted to join had to adapt to the prevailing logic of competition, efficiency, and status.

A shifting order since 2015

Since around 2015, that picture has been shifting. The rise of China and the Global South has made Western hegemony far less self-evident. At the same time, Europe and the US have seen growing scepticism toward globalisation. Populist politics and fears of migration fueled a turn inward, from Brexit to new restrictions on student and research exchanges. The fracture between the US and China in science and technology has left universities particularly vulnerable. Suddenly, it’s no longer just about sharing knowledge. It is also about strategic control.

Multipolarity or fragmentation?

So where does that leave us? On the one hand, the future is multipolar: more countries and regions are building strong universities and scientific infrastructures. That’s good news for the diversity and vitality of the academic world. On the other hand, Marginson shows how persistent inequalities and power imbalances remain. The language, the rankings, and the rules are still mostly Western. Additionally, the risks of deglobalization are real. Less cooperation and more closure could impoverish science at precisely the moment when global challenges – climate, migration, pandemics – demand more shared knowledge and collective solutions.

Beyond nostalgia

Nostalgia for that period of seemingly limitless internationalisation is understandable, but also naïve. Even then, inequalities and colonial continuities were deeply present. Today’s turning point forces us to ask more complex questions: what kinds of cooperation do we want? Who sets the agenda, and how do we ensure that internationalisation becomes more than just exporting one model to the rest of the world?

Abstract of the study:
Purpose
After reviewing global ontology and spatiality, globalization (worldwide convergence and integration), geopolitics, and the interacting national and global scales, the paper tracks the changing geopolitical order in general and in higher education in two main historical phases: Western-dominated and primarily U.S.-led globalization from 1990 to 2015, and partial deglobalization in the West and the American decoupling since 2015.
Design/Approach/Methods
The paper develops an original theorized historical synthesis, drawing on a range of scholarly and empirical sources.
Findings
The uneven but widespread post-2015 Western pushback against cross-border connections has been triggered by (a) the erosion of the longstanding colonial order and the growing global multiplicity in agency, culture, and identity, including the rise of China and much of the global South; and (b) the neoliberal immiseration of Euro-American populations which has helped to fuel populist politics. Normative internationalization and cosmopolitanism have given way to assertions of singular national identity and the weakening of multilateralism, nativist resistance to migration, including cross-border student mobility, and the U.S.-engineered partial breakdown in relations between the U.S. and China in political economy, technology, science, and universities.